level of confidence in the efficacy of infection control precautions, participants' knowledge scores regarding safe work practices suggest that . additional education is warranted. Educational programs are useful in enhancing the public health response to bioterrorism and its consequences. (J Occup Environ
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DOl: lO,1097101Jom. OOOO1OSllQ3.lSllM, e6 istory is replete with examples of biolOgic warfare, but the use of these States has been extremely limited, and the capability of the public health system to respond to a biotetrorlSf event is largely unknown,l-lI 'In ·theFall of 2001, the readiness of the U.s, public heath system to respond to a signifi-' eanl pabJie health emergency· was tested after the intentional dissemination of Bacillus anthracis spores through the U.S. postal system. 12 This act of bioterrorism, which. resulted in 22 anthrax infections and 5 deaths, underscored the importance of the public health system's readiness to deal with the threat of bioterrorism and highlighted gaps to be addressed. 13--16 Following so closely on the World . Trade Center Disaster on September 11, 2001, the anthrax attacks placed enormous burdens on already strained public health systems, especially in the tristate area (New York. New Jersey, and Connecticut), Public health responsibilitie,s after the c anthrax attacks included providing expert consultative advice regarding the appropriate care to anthrax patients, investigating possible contamination sites, testing of numerous materials suspected of anthrax contamination (the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene tested over 2000 such specimens in a 2-month period alone), hospital surveillance for new
cases. administration of antibloUc
prophylaxis to tens of thousands, of . " ' Individuals and providing at-ns.1\..
• . risk. communication informauon to the general public. 17 . 18 These responsibilities were in addition to the routine deli very of essential services and affected nearly every sector of the public health infrastructure, including hospitals, clinics! pharmacies, and medical practices, all · of whom reported a significant rise in the number of patients with psychosomatic complaints and antibiotic requests. Yet, despite these many challenges, all sectors of the public health infrastructure responded rapidly and, in hindsight, with remarkable effectiveness. 19 Nevertheless, it became clear in the Fall of 2001, that there was a pressing need to rapidly educate clinicians on the signs and symptoms and reporting mechanisms o 10 erronsm-re seases, mcluding cutaneous and pulmonary anthrax. Although few studies have examined the bioterrorism readiness of the clinical segment of the public health sector, several published reports provide evidence of both knowledge gaps and the high levels of interest in bioterrorism related training. 21 -23 For example, an October 2001 survey of family physicians (n = 614) conducted by Chen et al. found that only 18% of respondents had any prior bioterrorism training, 93% reponed that they needed such training, and 75% considered themselves unprepared to recognize bioterrorism-related illnesses.24 Most of the participants felt more competent to deal with naniral disasters and natural infectious disease outbreaks than with bioterrorism. Of special concern was the finding that only 57% of these family physicians knew how to report· a suspected bioterrorism case.
In 2002, Rico et al. surveyed licensed physicians (n = 134) and nurses (n = 121) in Miami-Dade County. The investigators found that 97% of physicians and 92% of nurses were interested in receiving bioterrorism training.25 Interest was especially high for training on the recognition of potential bioterrorism events and on the overall public health· response to these emergencies. Only 21 % of physicians and 7% of nurses in that sample believed they had updated knowledge on the signs, symptoms, treatment, modes of transmission, and communicability of class A agents (eg, smallpox, anthrax, tularemia,. plague, botulism, and hemorrhagic ·fevers).
A large-scale survey mailed to the medical and nursing professionals living and working in Hawaii. conducted in the Summer of 200 I by Lanzilolti et al., examined the availability and capability of medical professionals to respond to casualties caused by weapons of mass destruction?" Although the response rate was low (23%, n = 3386 for physicians; 'and 22.4%, n = 2775 for nurses, elf gs are 0 mterest. As in other studies exploring these issues, the investigators found that both physicians and nurses reported having low knowledge levels regarding class A agents and a perceived inability to recognize and treat patients with diseases of bioterrorism. Less than 10% of physicians in that sample reported that they considered themselves able to treat victims of bioterrorism iitcidents. In contrast, respondents reported generally high levels of willingness to report to duty during a bioterrorism incident, with a positive correlation seen between high levels of self-reported knowledge and willingness to respond. Therefore, it may be possible to increase clinicians' willingness to respond to a bioterrorism event through physician education and training.
Finally, a 2003 survey supported by the National Network for Irrununization Enforcement found that nurses (n = 2627) who were under the age of 50, were trained within the past 10 years or who had little or no experience with smallpox vaccinations were less likely to consent to receive the smallpox vaccine. 27 Knowledge regarding the effectiveness of the vaccine was highest in nurses with higher levels of education and in those wh() had received a prior smallpox vaccination. Nearly one third of the nurses thought that they were unlikely to contract smallpox even if they were exposed . through close contact with .an infeeted patient. . . ' The ability to respond quickly to the public health emergency resUlting from the anthrax attacks was dependent in part on the preplarining efforts of the Centers ' for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other governmental agencies and institutions. One of CDC's plarining . initiatives included the development of Centers for Public Health . Preparedness (the Centers)."! The purpose of the Centers is to ensure the capability of the public healthw()rksented by bioterrorism . and other weapons of mass destruction. ' The Columbia University, Mailman School of Public Health Center, one of 21 such Centers nationwide, responded to both the World Trade Center attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks in a number of ways.>9 In response to reqliests from community-based clinicians (including phYSicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants) for more information on bioterrorism, the Columbia Center developed, implemented, and evaluated an educationalprogram designed specifically for these providers. These front-line clinicians are especially important to target for this type of education because front-line medical providers, they frequently have a number of barriers, such as time constraint to obtaining up-ta-date continuing education information. To augment our educational program, we administered a brief questionnaire designed to increase our understanding of · commun,ity-based clinicians knowledge, attitudes, and behavioral intentions toward diseases of bioterrorism. Finally, for planning purposes, we asked clinicians what additional public health emergency-related training they felt they needed, as well as the preferred format for this training. 
Measures
In the interest of maximizing program time, we ch.ose to administer a single retrospective pretest· at the conclusion of the program. 30 The testing procedure .was submitted f.or Columbia University IRB approval before the prograni and was granted an IRB exemption. The test procedure was explained to those in attendance, and participants were asked to voluntarily complete a self-administered 37-item questionnaire de-. signed to evaluate their knowledge, beliefs, and confidence regarding their ability to diagnose, treat, and report certain class A diseases of bioterrorism (eg, anthrax, smallpox, tulareniia, plague, -and botulism) as well as their own concerns and fears regarding contagion. We also asked 2 questions related to the clinicians' degree of exposure to the World Trade Center Disaster (eg, witness· ing the event at the time it happened either in person or on television or having reexp.osure through televisi.on
Results

Response Rate
A total of 377 practItioners attended the program; .of these, 310 completed the posttraining questionnaire (82% response rate). Seventyfive percent (n ;= 292) of the participants completed the course evaluation.
Demographics
Most of the survey respondents were middle-aged,malephysicians. The specialty with the most representation was · internal medicine (36%), followed by dentistry (26%) and pediatrics (8%)~ Table 1 displays the participants demographic data.
Knowledge
On a set' of 5 basic knowledge questions, participants generally had high scores, especially on items related to reporting requirements. Lower sc.ores were noted for ' items dealing with the differential diagn.oses of anthrax (eg, flu-like illness 
Confidence
Most participaIits felt that the program increased their overall confidence in their ability to: 1) recognize bioterrorist diseases (88.6%), 2) address their patients' concerns about bioterrorism diseases (83.2%), 3) treat suspected cases (74.6%). and 4) report suspected cases to the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (73%).
Concerns
Clinicians reported overall concern about future bioterrorism attacks (77.4%), and specifically concern about anthrax (58.4%) and smallpox (61%). Only 37.7% felt that the U.S . government was able to protect the public's health during a bioterrorist attack. They also reported high levels of concern about bioterrorism among . their patients; 90.5% of clinicians reported that they provided care to patients with complaints related to fears of bioterrorism during the 2-month period before the training program. No significant correlation was found between clinicians' media exposure to the World Trade Center Disaster (WTC) 
Infection Control Practices and Contagion Concerns
Although nearly 69% of clinicians were more confident in their ability to use appropriate infection control practices after the training program, . their responses to several items demonstrated that important knowledge gaps remain in this area. For example, 40 .3% reported that they would institute respiratory precautions when treating patients with cutaneous anthrax, whereas 14% reported that they would not institute such precautions when treating suspected smallpox cases. Ten percent of respondents were concerned about contagion regarding patients with cutaneous anthrax. Clinicians with prior experience in treating known or suspected anthrax · cases were approximately half as likely to be concerned about contracting antfrrax than thoSe without such experience (OR, 0.40; 95% CI = 0.18-.91). Clinicians' degree of confidence in their clinical· assessment skills was directly associated with appropriate infection control intentions (OR, 1.9; 95% CI = 1.05-3.72). High levels of general knowledge regarding class A agents, however, did not correlate with appropriate infection control intentions. In addition, experience with actually providing clinical care to known or suspected cases of anthrax did not correlate with infection control behavioral intentions. Post exposure prophylaxis for smallpox 242 (78.1) Reporting requirements for class A agents 195 (69.6) Appropriate 
Discussion .
Our results suggest that bioterrorism training programs are effective in improving community-based clinicians' confidence regarding bioterever, objective measures are also helps to provide funding in support needed to detennine the impact of of these efforts.34 Other initiatives such training, and we are currently directed toward this goal include im. developing several models of assessproving the communications infra· ment of clinician response using structure, e.g. the Internet-based Climethods such as tabletop and counnicians' Biodefense Network created tern reportedly remains sporadlc and uneven. 38 -40 In particular, anecdotal reports regarding the paucity and unevenness of bioterrorism training for the public safety sector indicate that this is an especially important group to target for~peciaIized training. Uniformed services employees (eg, emergency medical services, transportation, fire, and police) should participate in basic emergency preparedness training as well as training on their roles and responsibilities during any future bioterrorist attacks. The process of developing, implementing, and evaluating educational programs on this complex topic for the many thousands of indlviduals who need them is daunting. These and other isSues will undoubtedly be of considerable interest in the months and years to come as the public health system continues to improve its overall emergency preparedneSs and response capabilities. 
